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The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission and the Appeal Court at 20 Years: Relationship 
Status – It’s Complicated? 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) was established in 1999 as an independent 
state funded body with the remit to review possible miscarriages of justice.1 It remains one of only 
a very few such bodies worldwide – aside from the Scottish Commission, there is a Criminal Cases 
Review Commission for England, Wales and Northern Ireland2 and similar commissions exist in 
Norway3 and North Carolina.4  At the time of writing, a Bill is progressing through Parliament in New 
Zealand that, if successful, would establish a Commission there.5  
 
The SCCRC has now been in operation for 20 years. A review of the first ten years of its operation 
concluded that, while it was an independent institution, it enjoyed a mutually respectful relationship 
with the High Court of Justiciary.6 This paper revisits that analysis and re-assesses the relationship 
between the Commission and the appeal court in light of the criticism that has sometimes been 
made of criminal cases review commissions – that they are too cautious and should be less 
conservative in terms of making referral decisions.7 In this paper, we defend the SCCRC against such 
criticism. The Commission, to operate effectively, must maintain the respect of the appeal court. It 
would be detrimental to the system as a whole – and would cause unnecessary stress to applicants 
– for the Commission to refer cases that had no realistic possibility of success. We conclude that its 
relationship with the courts, while generally harmonious, is not overly deferential. The SCCRC strikes 
an appropriate balance between referring a pool of cases that have a genuine chance of success 
(albeit sometimes a remote one) and not flooding the system with unmeritorious appeals. If there 
is a problem with correcting miscarriages of justice, we argue, that problem lies with the system of 
criminal appeals more broadly and not with the Commission. 
 
II. The History and Development of the SCCRC 
 
What is the SCCRC? 
 
Since its establishment in 1999, anyone who has been convicted of a criminal offence in Scotland 
can apply to the SCCRC to have their conviction reviewed. Before the SCCRC existed, convicted 
persons who had exhausted the normal appeal process had to apply to the Secretary of State for 
                                                 
1 We refer to it interchangeably as “the Commission” and “the SCCRC” in the remainder of the paper. 
2 Which, for the sake of brevity, will be referred to as the “English Commission” (to distinguish it from the 
SCCRC), but that is not to neglect its work in Wales and Northern Ireland. 
3 Ulf Stridbeck and Svein Magnussen, “Opening potentially wrongful convictions: look to Norway” (2012) 
58(2) Crim.L.Q. 267. 
4 Kent Roach, “An independent commission to review claims of wrongful convictions: lessons from North 
Carolina?” (2012) 58(2) Crim.L.Q. 283. 
5 Criminal Cases Review Commission Bill introduced on 27 September 2018, available at 
https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_80426/criminal-
cases-review-commission-bill [Accessed 9 September 2019]. 
6 Fiona Leverick, James Chalmers, Sarah Armstrong and Fergus McNeill, The Scottish Criminal Cases Review 
Commission: 10th Anniversary Research (SCCRC, 2009). 
7 This criticism has been made primarily in the context of the English Commission: see e.g. Michael Naughton, 
“The Criminal Cases Review Commission: innocence versus safety and the integrity of the criminal justice 
system” (2012) 58(2) Crim.L.Q. 207. 
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Scotland (a Government Minister). This changed following a series of notorious miscarriages of 
justice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, mostly relating to terrorist cases. Concern over these 
led to the establishment of two criminal cases review commissions: one for England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland in 19978 and one for Scotland two years later.9 The SCCRC considers applications 
in relation to convictions and sentences, although the bulk of its applications – 82 per cent – relate 
to convictions.10 It has no power to quash a conviction or to adjust a sentence – this must still be 
done by the appeal court.11  
 
The SCCRC has eight legal officers and a Head of Casework,12 an annual budget of over £1 million to 
conduct investigations13 and extensive legal powers to compel other parties (both public bodies and 
private individuals) to provide information it deems necessary.14 One third of the SCCRC 
Commissioners must be solicitors or advocates of at least ten years standing and a further third 
must have knowledge or experience of the criminal justice system.15 In practice there have been 
between six and eight Commissioners and at least two have always been lay members, such as 
academics and figures from the church or medical profession.16  
 
The test for referral 
 
The SCCRC can refer a conviction to the appeal court if it believes (a) “a miscarriage of justice may 
have occurred”; and (b) “it is in the interests of justice that a reference should be made”.17 The term 
miscarriage of justice is one that can be understood in different ways – it is sometimes used in 
common parlance simply to describe the conviction of any factually innocent person.18 The 
reference to the term “miscarriage of justice” here, however, is a reference to the single ground of 
appeal against conviction that exists in Scotland.19 It is clear then that, like the English Commission,20 
the SCCRC is utilising the same test that the court applies when determining appeals against 
conviction, rather than operating a test independent of legal considerations.21 
 
                                                 
8 As recommended by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 
Report (HMSO, 1993) Cm.2263, Ch.11. 
9 As recommended by the Sutherland Committee: S Sutherland, Criminal Appeals and Alleged Miscarriages 
of Justice: Report (HMSO, 1996) Cm.3245. 
10 SCCRC, Annual Report 2018-2019 (SCCRC, 2019) p.21. 
11 Our interest in this paper is primarily in its role in conviction referral. For discussion of the SCCRC’s sentence 
review function, see James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, “The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission 
and its referrals to the Appeal Court: the first ten years” [2010] Crim.L.R. 608, 615-620. 
12 SCCRC, Annual Report 2018-2019 (2019) p.15.  
13 SCCRC, Annual Report 2018-2019 (2019) p.58.  
14 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 ss.194H, 194I and 194IA (subsequently “the 1995 Act”) 
15 1995 Act s.194A. 
16 Peter Duff, “Straddling two worlds: reflections of a retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner” (2009) 
72(5) M.L.R. 693, 694. 
17 1995 Act s.194C. 
18 Fiona Leverick, Kathryn Campbell and Isla Callander, “Post-conviction review: questions of innocence, 
independence, and necessity” (2017) 47(1) Stetson Law Review 45, 50. 
19 1995 Act ss.106(3) (solemn procedure) and 175(5) (summary procedure). 
20 Although their test for referral is phrased differently – by virtue of s.13 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 the 
English Commission can only refer a case where it is satisfied that there is a “real possibility” that the 
conviction will be quashed if the referral is made (or the sentence changed in the case of a sentence referral). 
21 M, Petitioner [2006] CSOH 112; 2006 S.L.T. 907 at [30]. 
3 
 
In order for a conviction to be quashed as a miscarriage of justice, it must be based on a legally 
recognised factor. Two factors are specified in legislation: the existence of evidence that was not 
heard at the original proceedings22 and an unreasonable jury verdict.23 Others – all of which relate 
to some sort of procedural irregularity such as evidence wrongfully admitted or excluded, trial judge 
misdirection, or defective legal representation – are set out in case law.24 
 
The appeal court as a (brief) gatekeeper 
 
The historical account would not be complete without noting two changes that were made in 2010 
to the legislation governing the SCCRC. The impetus for these was the seminal case of Cadder v HM 
Advocate,25 in which the UK Supreme Court held that Scots law violated the European Convention 
on Human Rights as detained suspects did not have a right to legal assistance. In response to Cadder, 
the Scottish Parliament immediately passed the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention 
and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010,26 giving suspects the right to a private consultation with a solicitor 
prior to and during police questioning. It also inserted two new provisions about the Commission 
into the 1995 Act. The first related to the SCCRC’s test for referral, where the interests of justice test 
was expanded to require that the Commission “have regard to the need for finality and certainty in 
the determination of criminal proceedings”.27 The second introduced a gatekeeping role for the 
appeal court in relation to SCCRC references, giving the court the power to refuse to hear a 
reference if “it is not in the interests of justice that any appeal arising from the reference should 
proceed”, having regard to “finality and certainty”.28 Prior to this, the court was obliged to grant any 
Commission reference case a full appeal hearing. 
 
The provisions were inserted due to a fear that the Cadder ruling would lead to a flood of 
applications to the SCCRC from convicted persons who had not been offered legal assistance during 
their detention and that this might, in turn, lead to a flood of appeals that would swamp the courts.29 
The 2010 Act was passed as an emergency measure and the Scottish Government commissioned 
Lord Carloway to review the law in the light of Cadder, including the provisions affecting the SCCRC. 
By the time Lord Carloway reported,30 it was clear that the feared ‘flood’ of references following 
Cadder had not materialised31 and he recommended that the High Court’s gatekeeping provision be 
repealed.32 He did, however, recommend that the “finality and certainty” limb of the Commission’s 
test should remain and that, in determining SCCRC appeals (and only SCCRC appeals), an additional 
                                                 
22 1995 Act ss.106(3)(a) (solemn procedure) and 175(5) (summary procedure). 
23 1995 Act s.106(3)(b) (solemn procedure only).  
24 See Leverick, Chalmers, Armstrong and McNeill, The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission: 10th 
Anniversary Research (2009) pp.18-20 for a comprehensive list. 
25 [2010] UKSC 43; 2010 S.L.T. 1125. 
26 Subsequently “the 2010 Act”. 
27 1995 Act s.194C(2). 
28 1995 Act s.194DA. 
29 Scottish Parliament, Official Report (27 Oct 2010) (Session 3, Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body 2011) 
col 29560. 
30 Lord Carloway, The Carloway Review: Report and Recommendations (Scottish Government, 2011) 
(subsequently “Carloway Report”). 
31 Carloway Report, para 8.2.23. 
32 Carloway Report, para 8.0.3. 
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“interests of justice” limb should be added to the miscarriage of justice test used to determine 
appeals against conviction.33 These recommendations were criticised as illogical and unnecessary.34  
 
The appeal court was not slow to utilise its gatekeeping provision – it rejected one case and stated 
that it came close to refusing to hear another, neither of which were Cadder-based appeals.35 Its 
power to do so, however, has since been removed. Lord Carloway’s report started a protracted 
process of law reform that became dominated by his more controversial recommendation to abolish 
the requirement in Scots law for corroboration in criminal cases,36 a proposal that was taken forward 
by the Scottish Government in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill.37 The political controversy this 
attracted led the government eventually to commission a second review, this time of the safeguards 
that would be necessary if the corroboration requirement was abolished.38 This review 
recommended research into the Scottish jury system before any decisions about corroboration 
were made39 and a two-year jury research project concluded in October 2019.40 At the time of 
writing, the future of corroboration had yet to be announced. Most importantly for present 
purposes, the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 – minus the provision on corroboration – was 
passed and, following an amendment proposed at Stage 2, the Act repealed the two provisions in 
the emergency legislation relating to the SCCRC.41 As such, the appeal court no longer has the power 
to reject SCCRC references and the SCCRC is no longer required to have regard to finality and 
certainty when determining whether a referral is in the interests of justice. This is not to say, 
however, that such interests are irrelevant – the Commission acknowledges that “in any modern 
justice system, legal finality must be valued”.42 But it also states that it “believes, as a rule, that the 
interests of justice are better served by righting substantial injustices than through an overly rigid 
application of the principle of finality”.43 
 
The value of the SCCRC 
 
The SCCRC has two major advantages over the prior position whereby post-conviction review lay in 
the hands of a government minister: independence from government, and investigatory powers and 
resources. In relation to the first, any post-conviction review system that lacks independence may 
discourage potential applicants with genuine claims from applying, as they lack confidence that 
                                                 
33 Carloway Report, para 8.0.3. 
34 James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, “‘Substantial and radical change’: a new dawn for Scottish criminal 
procedure” (2012) 75(5) M.L.R. 837, 861-862. 
35 The court rejected the reference in Carberry v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 101; 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 – for 
discussion see Section IV. The court also came close to doing so in King v Webster [2011] HCJAC 109; 2011 
S.L.T. 342 at [5]. 
36 Carloway Report, para 7.2.55. 
37 Criminal Justice Scotland Bill ss.57-61, as introduced 20 June 2013. 
38 Lord Bonomy, Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review: Final Report (Scottish Government, 2015) 
(subsequently “Bonomy Review”). 
39 Bonomy Review, para 12.24. 
40 Rachel Ormston et al, Scottish Jury Research: Findings from a Large-Scale Mock Jury Study (Scottish 
Government, 2019). 
41 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 ss.94 and 96. As the report of proceedings indicates, there was very 
little discussion of this. One MSP spoke briefly against the amendment, but he did not put forward any 
substantive reasons against it. It was passed on a 5/3 majority. See Scottish Parliament, Official Report (8 
Sept 2015) (Session 4, Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body 2015) cols 36-40. 
42 SCCRC, Position Paper - Referrals to the High Court: The Commission’s Statutory Test (SCCRC, 2014) para 
17. 
43 SCCRC, Position Paper - Referrals to the High Court: The Commission’s Statutory Test (2014) para 17. 
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these will be impartially reviewed.44 This has been proffered as the reason for the low numbers 
applying for post-conviction review in Canada, which retains a system similar to the prior position 
in Scotland.45 This is especially so, as wrongful conviction can sometimes be the result of state 
malpractice and it is important that a post-conviction review body is free from political pressures in 
investigating such claims.46 Indeed, the need for independence is the basis on which some have 
argued for the establishment of criminal cases review commissions in jurisdictions where they do 
not yet exist, such as Australia,47 Canada,48 all US states bar North Carolina49 and South Africa.50 
 
The second advantage – investigatory powers and resources – is equally pertinent. This is illustrated 
by the example of South Australia, where the introduction of an independent criminal cases review 
commission was considered, but the decision was instead made to establish a new process for out 
of time appeals where additional evidence of innocence emerges. The convicted person, instead of 
applying to an independent body or to a government official, applies to the courts.51 But, as critics 
have pointed out,52 this ignores the difficulties, such as time and money, that convicted persons face 
in trying to obtain additional evidence of innocence, especially when they are incarcerated. It might 
be countered that such assistance can be provided by volunteer innocence projects, but that is to 
ignore the superior legal powers that criminal cases review commissions have to compel the 
production of evidence from individuals and organisations.53  
 
It is these advantages that mean that criminal cases review commissions are generally seen as a 
positive development – it is perhaps cost and political considerations that explain why they are not 
more widely established.54 Where disagreement does lie is in relation to the manner in which they 
should operate.  
 
 
                                                 
44 Clive Walker and Kathryn Campbell, “The CCRC as an option for Canada: forwards or backwards?” in 
Michael Naughton (ed), The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Hope for the Innocent? (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
45 Leverick, Campbell and Callander, “Post-conviction review: questions of innocence, independence, and 
necessity” (2017) 47(1) Stetson Law Review 45, 65. 
46 Leverick, Campbell and Callander, “Post-conviction review: questions of innocence, independence, and 
necessity” (2017) 47(1) Stetson Law Review 45, 65. 
47 David Hamer, “Wrongful convictions, appeals, and the finality principle: the need for a Criminal Cases 
Review Commission” (2014) 37(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 270, 311. 
48 Emma Cunliffe and Gary Edmond, “Reviewing wrongful convictions in Canada” (2017) 64(3-4) Crim.L.Q. 
473.  
49 Brittany L Walter, “American criminal justice reform: human factor analysis in wrongful convictions and the 
need for an independent commission” (2019) 53(1) University of San Francisco Law Review 145. 
50 Tapiwa Shumba, “Litigating innocence: the problem of wrongful convictions and absence of effective post-
conviction remedies in South Africa” (2017) 30(2) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 179.  
51 The Statutes Amendment (Appeals) Act 2013 amended the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 to give 
convicted persons a second or subsequent appeal in cases where there is “fresh and compelling” evidence 
of a wrongful conviction and it is in the interests of justice.   
52 Lynne Weathered, “Wrongful conviction in Australia” (2012) 80(4) University of Cincinnati L.R. 1391, 1410. 
53 Barry C Scheck and Peter J Neufeld, “Towards the formation of Innocence Commissions in America” (2002) 
86 Judicature 98, 104. It has been argued that the SCCRC has been particularly effective in this respect: see 
Lissa Griffin, “International perspectives on correcting wrongful convictions: the Scottish Criminal Cases 
Review Commission” (2013) 21(4) William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 1153, 1212.  
54 Jessica A Roth, “The Institutions of innocence review: a comparative sociological perspective” (2018) 70 
Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1143, 1147. 
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III. Criminal Cases Review Commissions and the Courts  
 
As noted earlier, the SCCRC can refer a case if it believes a miscarriage of justice may have occurred 
and it is in the interests of justice that a reference should be made.55 It is the first part of the test 
that we focus on here.56 The term “miscarriage of justice” is, as we noted earlier, a reference to the 
legal test that the appeal court applies when deciding whether or not to quash a conviction. 
 
It has sometimes been suggested that Commissions, when making referral decisions, play it ‘too 
safe’. The most radical proponent of this argument is Naughton, who has argued that post-
conviction review bodies should not be “bound to the criteria of the appeal courts”57 and should 
focus instead on factual innocence, and not the question of whether the applicant fulfils the legal 
criteria for a successful appeal. His argument is essentially that a different type of test should be 
used – one that places factual innocence at its heart – and he makes this point in the context of the 
English Commission which, he states, turns a “blind eye to potentially factually innocent victims who 
are unable to fulfil the real possibility test”.58  
 
As others have pointed out, Naughton does not explain how such a system would operate. The 
Commission itself cannot quash a conviction. There is little point in having a Commission that refers 
cases with no regard whatsoever to the legal test applied by the body that does have the power to 
do so. This could result in the vast majority of cases being rejected and such a body would quickly 
lose the confidence of the court itself and more widely. As Nobles and Schiff have argued,59 criminal 
cases review commissions have a sub-ordinate role and a relationship of “deference” to the appeal 
court forming, as they do, part of the self-contained legal system within which the courts also 
operate.60 In order to operate effectively – and actually get convictions quashed – they must talk 
the same language as the appeal court and present cases in the same terms, rather than utilising 
the language and arguments of, for example, the media or the general public. 
 
It might also be said that a focus on factual innocence could be counter-productive. On one level it 
is appealing, because of the “clear injustice”61 of convicting the factually innocent. But factual 
innocence is notoriously difficult to demonstrate, requiring as it does proof of a negative,62 and 
might actually lead to fewer referrals. This is illustrated by the experience at the North Carolina 
Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC), which refers cases on the basis of factual innocence and 
                                                 
55 See section II. 
56 For discussion of the second part of the test, see SCCRC, Position Paper - Referrals to the High Court: The 
Commission’s Statutory Test (2014) paras 11-18.  
57 Micheal Naughton, “The importance of innocence for the criminal justice system” in Michael Naughton 
(ed), The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Hope for the Innocent? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), p.25. 
58 Michael Naughton, “The Criminal Cases Review Commission: innocence versus safety and the integrity of 
the criminal justice system” (2012) 58(2) Crim.L.Q. 207, 211. The “real possibility” test is the test for referral 
used by the English Commission: see n 20. 
59 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, “Miscarriages of justice: a systems approach” (1995) 58(3) M.L.R. 299, 
315. 
60 Although cf. Duff, “Straddling two worlds: reflections of a retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner” 
(2009) 72(5) M.L.R. 693, 718. 
61 Roach, “An Independent Commission to review claims of wrongful convictions: lessons from North 
Carolina?” (2012) 58(2) Crim.L.Q. 283, 299. 
62 Stephanie Roberts and Lynne Weathered, “Assisting the factually innocent: the contradictions and 
compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review Commission” (2009) 29(1) O.J.L.S. 43, 58.  
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where, as of August 2019, only 14 convictions had been referred since its inception in 2007.63 It also 
neglects the fact that procedural errors, while not demonstrating factual innocence, can cast doubt 
over the guilt of the person concerned.64 
 
A less radical argument is to suggest that, while Commissions do and should operate in the context 
of the legal tests and standards used by appeal courts, they should, nonetheless, take a less 
conservative approach to referrals. This argument has been made by the House of Commons Justice 
Select Committee, in the context of the English Commission.65 To place this in context, the English 
Commission can refer a case only where it considers that “there is a real possibility that the 
conviction, verdict, finding or sentence would not be upheld were the reference to be made”.66 
“Real possibility” means more than “an outside chance or a bare possibility” but less than a 
“probability or a likelihood or a racing certainty”.67 But, like the Scottish test and its use of “may”, 
this leaves some room for interpretation between these two extremes. 
 
The Justice Committee noted that 70 per cent of cases referred by the English Commission were 
successful on appeal,68 and that the English Commission – at the time – had a targeted success rate 
for referrals of between 60 and 80 per cent.69 It concluded that:70 
 
where potential miscarriages of justice are concerned we consider that the CCRC should be 
willing to err on the side of making a referral. The Commission should definitely never fear 
disagreeing with, or being rebuked by, the Court of Appeal. If a bolder approach leads to five 
more failed appeals but one additional miscarriage being corrected, then that is of clear 
benefit. We recommend that the CCRC be less cautious in its approach to the ‘real possibility’ 
test. 
 
Duff has gone further and suggests that there may even be grounds for referring cases where the 
conviction has little – or even no – chance of being quashed under the law as it stands.71 He suggests 
                                                 
63 See https://innocencecommission-nc.gov/about/ [Accessed 9 September 2019] 
64 Leverick, Campbell and Callander, “Post-conviction review: questions of innocence, independence, and 
necessity” (2017) 47(1) Stetson Law Review 45, 66-69. 
65 House of Commons Justice Select Committee, Criminal Cases Review Commission: 12th Report of 2014-15 
(2015) HC Paper No 850. See similarly Carolyn Hoyle, “Forensic science and expert testimony in wrongful 
convictions: a study of decision-making at the Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2019) 59(4) B.J. Crim. 919, 
934-935; Marika Linnea Henneberg, “Post-conviction disclosure in England and Wales: could conviction 
integrity units (CIUs) modelled on those in the USA be the way forward?” (2019) International Journal of Law, 
Crime and Justice (in press). 
66 Criminal Appeal Act 1995 s.13(1)(a).  
67 R v Criminal Cases Review Commission ex. p. Pearson [2000] 1 Cr App R 141, at 149 per Lord Bingham CJ. 
68 House of Commons Justice Select Committee, Criminal Cases Review Commission: 12th Report of 2014-15, 
para 17.  
69 House of Commons Justice Select Committee, Criminal Cases Review Commission: 12th Report of 2014-15, 
para 17. This targeted success rate for referrals of between 60 and 80 per cent was previously listed as a Key 
Performance Indicator in the English Commission’s Annual Report: see CCRC, Annual Report and Accounts 
2014/15 (2015) HC 210, p.73. It is worth noting that, in the years since the Justice Committee report, a 
targeted success rate in terms of referral conclusions has disappeared from the English Commission’s listed 
Key Performance Indicators: see CCRC, Annual Report and Accounts 2015/16 (2016) HC 244, p.87. 
70 House of Commons Justice Select Committee, Criminal Cases Review Commission: 12th Report of 2014-15, 
para 20. 
71 Duff, “Straddling two worlds: reflections of a retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner” (2009) 72(5) 
M.L.R. 693, 719. 
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three reasons for doing this. First, a referral can help to clarify the law where it is conflicting or 
unclear.72 Duff gives as an example of this Fulton v HM Advocate,73 where, following a reference by 
the Commission, a bench of five judges was assembled to overrule a decision on corroboration taken 
by the appeal court only nine months earlier and the conviction was quashed.74  
 
Second, such a referral might encourage the court to define particular grounds of appeal more 
broadly.75 Duff uses as an example Gilmour v HM Advocate,76 where the appeal court admitted 
evidence from Professor Gudjonsson, a forensic psychologist, to the effect that the appellant was 
abnormally suggestible and compliant, thus throwing the reliability of his confession into doubt. The 
legal practitioners among the Commissioners had, Duff notes, been dubious that this referral would 
succeed because this was the first time Professor Gudjonsson had given evidence to a Scottish court 
(although he had appeared in many English appeals) and the appeal court had previously been very 
reluctant to admit expert evidence as to the effect of the accused’s personality on the reliability of 
a confession. Duff also cites Campbell, Steele and Gray v HM Advocate,77 where the Crown tried to 
argue that evidence from two cognitive psychologists of four experimental studies they had carried 
out at the Commission’s request was inadmissible as mere opinion evidence on the credibility and 
reliability of police witnesses. Admitting the evidence was contrary to the leading authority at the 
time, but the court admitted the evidence and quashed the convictions of two of the appellants on 
this basis. 
 
Third, given that there is no legal limit on the number of times that the Commission might refer a 
case, the SCCRC can exert political pressure by re-referring cases multiple times if the court rejects 
them. The resulting publicity might, Duff suggests, bring pressure to bear on the court and/or the 
government to change the law.78  
 
Against these points, however, a number of counter-arguments can be made. The first is that there 
is a human cost to consider – referring a case that genuinely has no chance of success risks raising 
the hopes of the applicant only to have them cruelly dashed at a later stage. It also is not cost 
neutral. Referring cases with little chance of success adds to a court workload that is already busy 
and risks delaying more meritorious appeals. The point might also be made that such referrals could 
damage the relationship between the Commission and the courts. There exists a fine balance 
between pushing the boundaries of the law and a state of affairs where the court no longer takes 
the Commission’s arguments seriously, which might risk the success of future appeals.  
 
In the next section of the paper, we explore these issues by looking at the referrals that the SCCRC 
has made since its inception 20 years ago.  
 
 
                                                 
72 Duff, “Straddling two worlds: reflections of a retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner” (2009) 72(5) 
M.L.R. 693, 719. 
73 [2005] HCJAC 4. 
74 Duff, “Straddling two worlds: reflections of a retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner” (2009) 72(5) 
M.L.R. 693, 719.  
75 Duff, “Straddling two worlds: reflections of a retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner” (2009) 72(5) 
M.L.R. 693, 719. 
76 Gilmour v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 48; 2007 S.L.T. 893. 
77 Campbell, Steele and Gray v HM Advocate 2004 S.C.C.R. 220. 
78 Duff, “Straddling two worlds: reflections of a retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner” (2009) 72(5) 
M.L.R. 693, 720.  
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IV. The SCCRC and the Appeal Court 
 
The success rate of SCCRC referrals 
 
In its latest annual report, the SCCRC states that, as of 31 March 2019, it had received 2614 
applications, 82 per cent of which were for review of a conviction and 18 per cent of which were for 
review of a sentence.79 As of 31 March 2019, 1937 of the conviction review applications had 
concluded (the others were still under review).80 The Commission had referred 80 of these 1937 
concluded applications for conviction review to the court, a referral rate for convictions of 4.1 per 
cent.81 
 
Our interest here is in the reception these referrals have received from the appeal court. Table 1 
shows the fate of the convictions referred to the appeal court by the Commission since its 
establishment in 1999. Of these 80 referred convictions, only 77 reached the court as three of the 
appeals (one each in 2005, 2007 and 2009) were abandoned before this stage. Of the 77 cases where 
the court heard the case, the court quashed the conviction in 39 of these, an overall ‘success rate’ 
of 51 per cent.   
 
Table 1: Outcome of Commission referrals 1999-2019 (convictions) 
 
 Number of referrals Successful referrals Cumulative ‘success 
rate’ (per cent) 
1999 2 2 100 
2000 3 1 60 
2001 9 7 71 
2002 2 1 69 
2003 8 3 58 
2004 4 1 54 
2005 4 2 53 
2006 5 2 51 
2007 4 1 49 
2008 4 0 44 
2009 4 1 43 
2010 4 3 45 
2011 4 4 49 
2012 6 4 51 
2013 4 0 48 
2014 1 1 49 
2015 1 1 49 
2016 082 N/A 49 
2017 4 1 49 
2018 2 2 50 
2019 2 2 51 
Total 77 39 51 
 
                                                 
79 SCCRC, Annual Report 2018-2019 (2019) pp.20-21 
80 SCCRC, Annual Report 2018-2019 (2019) p.30. 
81 SCCRC, Annual Report 2018-2019 (2019) p.30. The referred cases are listed on the Commission’s website 
at http://www.sccrc.co.uk/conviction [Accessed 9 September 2019] 
82 Although the Commission did not refer any convictions in 2016 it did refer a number of sentences.  
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What can we make of these figures? On one view, a ‘success rate’ of around 50 per cent might 
suggest that the Commission is referring cases with a limited chance of success. While one must be 
cautious about drawing patterns from such a small sample of cases, the success rate has declined 
from the level that it reached in the first few years of the SCCRC’s operation – the cumulative success 
rate in 2002 after four years of operation was almost 70 per cent. It is perhaps not surprising, 
though, that a newly established Commission would have a particularly high success rate in its first 
few years of operation. There is likely to be an initial batch of ‘pent up’ demand – relatively clear-
cut cases that have until the establishment of the Commission, lacked an avenue for redress. For 
some time now, the success rate has been relatively stable at around 50 per cent.83 This is higher 
than that for appeals against conviction generally, only around 25 per cent of which succeed.84  
 
The success rate also needs to be examined in the context of the proportion of cases referred in the 
first place. A 100 per cent success rate could be achieved by referring only a tiny number of cases in 
which a successful outcome was inevitable. If every single case that was referred succeeded, that 
suggests that there might be further cases that would have succeeded – and ought to have 
succeeded – if only a less cautious approach had been taken.85 This is demonstrated by the NCIIC in 
North Carolina. As of 2017, the NCIIC had referred only 11 convictions over a ten-year period, a 
referral rate of 0.64 per cent, but all but one of its referrals resulted in the conviction being 
quashed.86 The NCIIC has, however, been criticised on the basis that its test for referral – which 
requires evidence of actual innocence – sets the bar too high and excludes genuinely meritorious 
cases where positive evidence of actual innocence is near impossible to come by.87 
 
In the next section we go on to examine the cases that the Commission has referred but where the 
conviction was not quashed by the appeal court. Is the Commission referring cases that have next 
to no prospect of success? If so – was there any merit in making these referrals? Are cases being 
referred (and rejected) where there were genuine doubts over the appellant’s factual innocence? 
And what do these rejected cases tell us about the relationship between the two bodies? It is these 
questions that we attempt to address. 
 
The relationship between the SCCRC and the courts – the rejected cases 
 
In our sample, 38 referrals did not result in the conviction being quashed. Two of these involved 
multiple accused, so were heard together by the court. In one of the other (unsuccessful) cases 
included within Table 1,88 the appeal was not argued on the basis identified by the Commission so 
                                                 
83 A review of the Commission’s work at ten years put the success rate for conviction referrals at 60 per cent: 
Leverick, Chalmers, Armstrong and McNeill, The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission: 10th 
Anniversary Research (2009), p.33. The discrepancy between that figure and the cumulative success rate for 
the same period offered in this paper is attributable to the fact that, at the time of the previous study, there 
were a number of referred cases that had yet to be determined. 
84 Scottish Government, Criminal Appeal Statistics, Scotland: 2008/09 (Scottish Government, 2009). This is 
the most recent period for which figures are available – the publication of criminal appeal statistics was 
discontinued in 2010. 
85 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, “After ten years: an investment in justice?” in Michael Naughton (ed), The 
Criminal Cases Review Commission: Hope for the Innocent? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.159. 
86 Leverick, Campbell and Callander, “Post-conviction review: questions of innocence, independence, and 
necessity” (2017) 47(1) Stetson Law Review 45, 59-61. 
87 Leverick, Campbell and Callander, “Post-conviction review: questions of innocence, independence, and 
necessity” (2017) 47(1) Stetson Law Review 45, 67-69.  
88 Thomson (No. 1) v HM Advocate [2005] HCJAC 7. 
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is excluded from our analysis.89 In 33 of the remaining cases, there is a judgment, so it is those cases 
that we focus on. 
 
Table 2: The ‘routine’ rejections 
 
Case Basis for referral Court response 
Gray (Thomas) v HM 
Advocate 2004 S.L.T. 
397 
Defective representation.  Test for defective representation was not 
met. 
McCormack v HM 
Advocate [2005] 
HCJAC 38 
Additional scientific evidence 
relating to recovered memory.  
Statutory test for additional evidence was not 
met. 
Bishop v Procurator 
Fiscal, Tain [2005] 
HCJAC 40 
Additional evidence – witness 
statement and a precognition 
on oath of another witness 
(relating to a previous allegation 
of sexual misconduct).  
Statutory test for additional evidence was 
only partially met. 
Gray (William) and 
O’Rourke v HM 
Advocate 2005 1 J.C. 
233 
Jury misconduct.  Court disagreed that this was material. 
Neeson v HM 
Advocate [2006] 
HCJAC 68 
 
Additional evidence from three 
witnesses (one in person and 
two affidavits from deceased 
witnesses).  
Court agreed that it might meet statutory 
test for additional evidence and went as far 
as hearing the evidence, but ultimately 
concluded the test was only partially met. 
Coubrough v HM 
Advocate [2008] 
HCJAC 1390 
Additional evidence.  Statutory test for additional evidence was 
not met. 
McInnes v HM 
Advocate [2008] 
HCJAC 53 
Failure to disclose.  Agreed there was a failure but held that this 
did not mean the appellant was denied a fair 
trial. 
Beattie v HM 
Advocate [2009] 
HCJAC 22 
Additional scientific evidence 
that appellant was highly 
suggestible.  
Statutory test for additional evidence was 
only partially met. 
Thomson (No. 2)91 v 
HM Advocate [2010] 
HCJAC 11 
Sexual history questioning 
should have been permitted.  
Court applied the same test and concluded 
that it was rightly disallowed.  
Polland v HM 
Advocate [2010] 
HCJAC 29 
(1) Failure to disclose  
(2) Defective representation.  
(1) Agreed material should have been 
disclosed but no real possibility of jury 
reaching different verdict.  
(2) Disagreed that the test for defective 
representation was met. 
                                                 
89 It is no longer possible to argue a Commission referral on grounds other than those identified by the 
Commission unless the court gives its permission: 1995 Act s.194D(4A) and (4B). 
90 This dealt with the ground on which the Commission referred the case. See also Coubrough’s Exectrix v HM 
Advocate [2010] HCJAC 32; 2010 S.L.T. 577 (where they dealt with three grounds of appeal added by the 
applicant that were not identified by the SCCRC, after he died). 
91 Note this is the second time the Commission referred the case. On the first occasion (excluded from this 
analysis) the Commission referred on the basis of fresh evidence, but on appeal counsel did not argue this 
ground, arguing it instead on the basis of the sexual history questioning that formed the basis of the second 
referral. The appeal was rejected. 
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Gordon v HM 
Advocate [2010] 
HCJAC 44 
(1) Police investigation had 
been defective. 
(2) Additional evidence from a 
witness (that might support an 
alternative explanation for the 
complainer’s distress). 
(3) Failure to disclose.  
(1) No real possibility of jury reaching 
different verdict had additional lines of 
inquiry been pursued.  
(2) Statutory test for additional evidence 
partially met, but doubts over its 
admissibility and would not have assisted 
jury in their consideration of the issues.  
(3) Agreed material should have been 
disclosed but no real possibility of jury 
reaching different verdict. 
Affleck v HM 
Advocate [2010] 
HCJAC 61 
(1) Failure to disclose 
(outstanding drugs charges 
against a witness).  
(1) A duty to disclose did arise but the non-
disclosure of the outstanding charges did 
not, in the circumstances, render the trial 
unfair. 
Russell v Thomson 
[2010] HCJAC 138 
Conduct did not amount to a 
relevant charge of breach of the 
peace (so there was no case to 
answer).  
Conduct did meet test for breach of the 
peace. 
Casey v HM 
Advocate [2011] 
HCJAC 19 
Additional DNA evidence.  Statutory test for additional evidence was 
only partially met. 
O’Donnell v HM 
Advocate [2011] 
HCJAC 84 
Misdirection on confession 
evidence. 
Court disagreed this was a misdirection. 
Gage v HM Advocate 
[2012] HCJAC 14 
Dock ID made of the appellant 
in court (where no previous ID 
parade had taken place).  
Did not amount to an unfair trial. 
Beck v HM Advocate 
[2013] HCJAC 51 
Trial judge misdirection on 
standard of proof.  
Agreed there had been a misdirection in part 
but this was rectified after intervention of 
counsel so no miscarriage of justice. 
Young v HM 
Advocate [2014] 
HCJAC 113 
Additional scientific evidence of 
case linkage analysis.  
Court disagreed that this met the 
admissibility test for expert evidence. 
Docherty v HM 
Advocate [2014] 
HCJAC 94 
(1) Failure to disclose  
(2) Misdirection on dock ID 
(3) Cadder ground.  
(1) Failure to disclose/excluding confession 
would not have affected the outcome.  
(2) Agreed that there had been a 
misdirection on dock ID but this had not 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
(3) Agreed interview should not have been 
admissible but no real possibility that the 
jury's verdict would have been different if 
the interview had not been before it. 
Lilburn v HM 
Advocate [2015] 
HCJAC 50 
Additional psychiatric evidence 
(relating to diminished 
responsibility). 
Statutory test for additional evidence was 
only partially met. 
Kirk (No. 1) v 
Procurator Fiscal, 
Stirling [2017] HCJAC 
66 
The trial judge had erred in 
concluding test for intention 
had been met.  
Test for intention had been met. 
Rodger v HM 
Advocate [2017] 
HCJAC 65 
Defective representation.  Test for defective representation not met. 
13 
 
Graham v HM 
Advocate [2018] 
HCJAC 57 
Additional evidence relating to 
the appellant’s psychological 
state at the time of the killing. 
Statutory test for additional evidence was not 
met. 
 
The defining feature of the cases in Table 2 is that in none of these cases were the Commission and 
court fundamentally at odds. They both arrived at not unreasonable conclusions based on the same 
legal tests. In fact, in some of the cases the appeal court was at pains to point out that the 
Commission was right to refer the case. So, for example, in Neeson v HM Advocate,92 an additional 
evidence case, the court made a point of stating that it agreed with the Commission that, on the 
basis of the affidavits of the new witnesses, the case should have been referred.93 It was only after 
hearing the evidence and cross-examination of one of the witnesses94 that the court decided that 
his evidence was unreliable and the appeal must be refused.95 In other cases too, the court has 
stressed that, in its opinion, the Commission was right to refer the case even though the appeal 
ultimately did not succeed.96 
 
In the vast majority of these cases there was compelling evidence against the appellant. This does 
not necessarily mean that the Commission was ‘wrong’ to refer the case. As Griffin has pointed out, 
there may be some merit in bringing issues such as the performance of counsel and failures of 
disclosure to the court’s attention.97  
 
One case where the evidence against the appellant was less than compelling is Kirk (No. 1) v PF,98 
where the appellant had been convicted of assault after an encounter with a fellow dog walker. The 
basis of the conviction was that the complainer had been struck repeatedly with a dog lead. This 
first (unsuccessful) appeal was argued on the question of whether the justice had erred in law in 
concluding that the appellant had the required intent for assault.99 However, the Commission also 
referred the case on the basis that the presence of screaming on a recording of the incident played 
in court seemed to have been decisive to the justice’s decision to convict, but when a DVD of the 
recording was obtained by the Commission no such screaming could be heard.100 This was not 
argued at the first appeal101 – there appeared to be some doubts over the provenance of the 
recording obtained by the Commission. However, the court did comment obiter about the 
recording, but stated that its hands were tied in the absence of an agreement that the DVD made 
available to the SCCRC and copied to the court was a true copy of the dictaphone recording that was 
played in court.102 The applicant re-applied to the Commission with such an agreement and the case 
was referred for a second time.103 This time it was successful and although no written judgment is 
                                                 
92 Neeson v HM Advocate [2005] HCJAC 64. 
93 Neeson, [2005] HCJAC 64 at [14]. 
94 By the time the case was heard, the other one had died. 
95 Neeson, [2006] HCJAC 68 at [21]. The court also considered that the untested affidavits of the (by then) 
two deceased witnesses could not be regarded as credible or reliable so as to meet the test for additional 
evidence (at [23]). 
96 See e.g. Gray v HM Advocate 2005 J.C. 233 at [1]. 
97 Griffin, “International perspectives on correcting wrongful convictions: the Scottish Criminal Cases Review 
Commission” (2013) 21(4) William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 1153, 1184. 
98 Kirk (No. 1) v PF [2017] HCJAC 66; 2017 S.C.L. 982. 
99 Kirk, 2017 S.C.L. 982 at [6]. 
100 See SCCRC, News Release: Carol Kirk Referral (SCCRC, 13 September 2018). 
101 Kirk, 2017 S.C.L. 982 at [6]. 
102 Kirk, 2017 S.C.L. 982 at [18]. 
103 SCCRC, News Release: Carol Kirk Referral (SCCRC, 13 September 2018). 
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available, it is a safe assumption that the court this time accepted the provenance of the recording 
and agreed with the Commission.  
 
Table 3 displays the remaining ten cases where there was a more fundamental difference of opinion 
between the Commission and the court.  
 
Table 3: Cases that involved more fundamental disagreement 
 
Case Basis for referral Court response 
Crombie v Clark 2001 
S.L.T. 635 
Solicitor should not have submitted 
guilty plea on appellant’s behalf. 
No miscarriage of justice as appellant 
did not dispute his guilt (merely the 
quantum of the fraud). 
Harper v HM Advocate 
[2005] HCJAC 23  
“Lurking doubt” over the 
conviction. 
Not a recognised basis for establishing 
a miscarriage of justice has occurred. 
Swankie v HM Advocate 
[2008] HCJAC 59 
Defective representation. Commission applied incorrect test for 
defective representation. 
Murray v HM Advocate 
[2009] HCJAC 58 
Additional evidence regarding the 
reliability of confession (expert 
evidence that Murray exhibited 
abnormally high levels of 
compliance). 
Statutory test for additional evidence 
not met – court commented that 
Commission did not investigate the 
additional evidence thoroughly 
enough. 
Hunt v Aitken [2008] 
HCJAC 57 
(1) Basis on which justice convicted 
appellant unclear from stated case.  
(2) Justice made private 
assessment of evidence (by making 
own assessment of witness’ view 
based on photo produced at trial). 
(1) Stated case was only in draft and 
was not deficient. 
(2) Commission erred in equating the 
taking of evidence with the 
assessment of evidence. 
Ferrie v HM Advocate 
[2010] HCJAC 62 
(1) Insufficiency of evidence. 
(2) Unreasonable jury verdict.  
(1) There was a sufficiency of evidence. 
(2) Court disagreed that the jury 
verdict was unreasonable, describing 
one of the Commission’s suggestions 
as “fanciful”. 
Kalyanjee v HM Advocate 
[2014] HCJAC 44 
Additional psychiatric evidence 
(which may have founded a plea of 
diminished responsibility). 
Commission should not have treated 
additional evidence following a guilty 
plea being tendered in the same way 
as additional evidence following a 
conviction at trial. 
Carberry v HM Advocate 
[2013] HCJAC 101 
Evidence of jury impropriety. Court refused to hear the appeal.104 
Younas v HM Advocate 
[2014] HCJAC 114 
(1) Trial judge did not adequately 
summarise evidence for jury. 
(2) Warning should have been 
given over the evidence of one of 
the witnesses. 
Commission in error over the law on 
both points. 
Kinsella v HM Advocate 
[2011] HCJAC 58 
(1) Failure to disclose.  
(2) Police did not undertake 
adequate investigation. 
(1) Test for disclosure not met  
(2) Commission’s claim was without 
foundation. 
 
The cases in Table 3 are all referrals in which the Commission and the appeal court had more 
fundamental disagreements. Many of these cases involved the court making implied or overt 
                                                 
104 Under the now repealed provision that gave the court the power to do this – see section II. 
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criticism of the Commission for referring the case in the first place. So, for example, in Crombie v 
Clark,105 the court stated that “it is necessary to make it clear that we cannot and do not associate 
ourselves with the reasoning which led [the Commission] to their conclusion”.106 In Swankie v HM 
Advocate,107 the court stated that if it had not been a Commission referral, it would have been “very 
fortunate to have passed the stage of the sift”.108 In Hunt v Aitken,109 the court stated that they were 
“unable to understand”110 one aspect of the way the Commission framed the case and described 
the Commission as “mistaken”111 in its understanding of the case law. In Younas v HM Advocate112 
the court stated that there was a “significant defect”113 in the Commission’s understanding of the 
law and in Kalyenjee v HM Advocate114 the court referred to a “fundamental flaw” in the reference 
as the Commission had not understood the law in relation to additional evidence emerging after an 
appellant had pled guilty.115 In Ferrie v HM Advocate,116 the court referred to one of the 
Commission’s suggestions as “fanciful”.117 In Kinsella v HM Advocate,118 the court was critical of the 
Commission for setting the bar too low where an appeal is based on the disclosure of evidence.119  
 
Perhaps the most acute example of the court and Commission being at odds, however, is in Carberry 
v HM Advocate,120 where the court used its (then) power under s.194DA of the 1995 Act to refuse 
to hear a Commission reference.121 Carberry had been convicted of indecent assault and the 
Commission referred his conviction on the basis of jury impropriety (one juror had downloaded 
information about the appellant from the internet during the trial and certain jury members “may 
have had the impression that the applicant was a gangster”).122 The applicant had, however, already 
attempted to assert this as a ground of appeal at an earlier stage and this had been rejected by the 
court.123 There was, it should be said, strong evidence against the appellant, something which the 
                                                 
105 Crombie v Clark 2001 S.L.T. 635. 
106 Crombie, 2001 S.L.T. 635 at [14]. 
107 Swankie v HM Advocate [2008] HCJAC 59; 2008 S.L.T. 1128. 
108 Swankie, 2008 S.L.T. 1128 at [44]. The sift is the stage in the criminal appeals process where all appeals 
are initially scrutinised by a single judge and thrown out if the appeal contains no arguable grounds (see 1995 
Act s.107). Commission appeals are not subject to a sift. 
109 Hunt v Aitken [2008] HCJAC 57; 2008 S.C.C.R. 919. 
110 Hunt, 2008 S.C.C.R. 919 at [14]. 
111 Hunt, 2008 S.C.C.R. 919 at [15]. 
112 Younas v HM Advocate [2014] HCJAC 114; 2014 S.L.T. 1043. 
113 Younas, 2014 S.L.T. 1043 at [55]. See also further criticism of the Commission’s other reason for referring 
(that a warning was not given by the trial judge about the evidence of one of the witnesses) at [73]. 
114 Kalyenjee v HM Advocate [2014] HCJAC 44; 2014 S.L.T. 740. 
115 Kalyenjee, 2014 S.L.T. 740 at [70]. 
116 Ferrie v HM Advocate [2010] HCJAC 62; 2011 S.C.L. 8. 
117 Ferrie, 2011 S.C.L. 8. at [27]. 
118 Kinsella v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 58; 2011 S.C.C.R. 442. 
119 Kinsella, [2011] HCJAC 58 at [13]. (The S.C.C.R. report does not contain the relevant paragraph.) 
120 Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587. 
121 The power has since been removed – see section II. 
122 Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 at [12]. 
123 The appellant was originally given permission to appeal on a ground unrelated to the jury impropriety 
ground. When a juror came forward and made a statement about the original trial, he applied to the court 
to have the jury impropriety ground added to his grounds for appeal. The court refused to add it and in the 
end the original appeal against conviction was abandoned, with the appellant appealing only his sentence 
(see Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 at [1]-[6]). 
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Commission itself accepted, but it concluded in its statement of reasons124 that if jury bias could be 
made out, this would be sufficient for the conviction to be quashed. 
 
When the case reached the appeal court, the court started by stating that the gatekeeping power 
should only be exercised in an “exceptional case” where the Commission had:125  
 
demonstrably failed in its task; for example, by failing to apply the statutory test at all, by 
ignoring relevant factors; by considering irrelevant factors; by giving inadequate reasons, or 
by making a decision that is perverse. 
 
Carberry, the court continued, was such a case. The Commission was criticised for the “less than 
ideal” way in which it interviewed the jurors;126 for the (unwarranted) conclusions it drew from 
these interviews;127 for the (un)persuasiveness of the case it presented;128 for its failure (in the eyes 
of the court) to understand the law on jury bias;129 and for failing to have regard to finality and 
certainty, as it was then obliged by the legislation to do.130 
 
It is clear, then, that the court and the Commission are sometimes at odds and that when this 
happens, the court is not slow to criticise what it regards as the Commission’s errors. These are, 
however, a minority of cases and do need to be balanced against those where the court and 
Commission disagreed but where the court was at pains to state that the Commission was, 
nonetheless, right to refer the case.  
 
One thing that can be said about all of the cases in Table 3 that have been discussed so far, Carberry 
included, is that none of them were cases in which a clear claim of factual innocence could be made. 
Even in the cases referred on the basis of additional evidence, there was still convincing evidence 
on which a conviction could be based. They are not obvious cases of “miscarriage of justice” in the 
broad sense – they do not suggest that the Commission is referring cases that obviously ‘ought’ to 
succeed but the appeal court is rejecting them because they do not fit within the existing legal 
framework. 
 
This cannot, however, be said for all of the cases in our sample. In Harper v HM Advocate,131 the 
Commission referred based on a “lurking doubt” it harboured about the guilt of the appellant, 
despite the fact that the additional evidence the appellant presented did not meet the statutory 
test in s.106 of the 1995 Act. The court refused the appeal, noting that: 132 
 
                                                 
124 Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 at [18].  
125 Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 at [34].  
126 Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 at [9]. 
127 Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 at [38]. 
128 Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 at [37]. 
129 Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 at [42]. 
130 Carberry, 2013 S.C.C.R. 587 at [48]. In fact, the Commission did refer to the interests of certainty in 
referring the case, mentioning the need for an authoritative ruling from the appeal court on googling jurors, 
but the court was critical here too, stating that the terms finality and certainty “are references to the need 
for the particular case to be seen as concluded” and “do not constitute a direction to the SCCRC … to have 
regard to the need for certainty in the substantive law” (at [50]). 
131 Harper v HM Advocate [2005] HCJAC 23; 2005 S.C.C.R. 245. 
132 Harper, 2005 S.C.C.R. 245 at [33]. 
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it has never been recognised by the court that some general concern, or unease, in relation 
to a particular conviction, with no further specification, could be a basis upon which a 
conviction could be disturbed.  
 
Harper makes it clear, then, that the court will not entertain any Commission references if they do 
not fit into the legally recognised bases of appeal. The Commission has not taken this to mean that 
the categories of potential miscarriage of justice are fixed, stating that where it “does consider a 
potentially innovative ground, it will be necessary to determine whether the argument has provided 
a basis upon which the court might conclude that justice has not been done”.133 Nonetheless, since 
Harper the Commission has stuck firmly to recognised grounds of appeal in referring cases. 
 
This is illustrated by a case where a lurking doubt referral might have been made – Beck v HM 
Advocate,134 included in Table 2 above. Beck was convicted of assault, robbery and theft and has 
consistently disputed his conviction,135 primarily on the basis of the reliability of the identification 
evidence involved, with his case being taken up by two University based Innocence Projects 
(Glasgow Caledonian and Bristol).136 When the Commission finally referred the case it did so not on 
the basis of its own lurking doubt about the conviction, but on the basis that the trial judge’s 
directions on the standard of proof were inadequate, as he had failed to explain the phrase “beyond 
reasonable doubt” by reference to the modern formulation.137 The appeal still failed,138 but it is an 
illustration of the barriers that exist, forcing the Commission to frame cases in a way that fits the 
prevailing legal framework, rather than simply presenting cases in terms of doubts over the 
appellant’s guilt. 
 
This would perhaps be of less concern if there was strong evidence pointing to the appellant’s guilt. 
However, in both Harper and Beck there would appear to be room for doubt. In Harper, the 
appellant was convicted of murder. He admitted to stealing a video recorder from the deceased on 
Friday night,139 but not to killing him. On the basis of this – alongside witnesses who had seen the 
appellant on Friday night with a bag containing items from the deceased’s flat – the police 
proceeded on the basis that the deceased (whose body was found the following Monday) was killed 
on Friday. However, several reliable witnesses had seen the deceased on Saturday, and pathologists 
could not pinpoint the day of death,140 so the Crown case was built on the deceased having been 
killed on Saturday and the witnesses who had seen the bag being mistaken about the date.141 A 
former Commissioner has stated, however, that “our investigations of these witnesses’ testimony 
did not leave us convinced that they had got the day wrong”.142 There was also evidence, from a 
potential witness who had not been called at trial, that the deceased was scared of a group of young 
people who were in the habit of visiting him and that he had previously been assaulted by one of 
                                                 
133 SCCRC, Position Paper - Referrals to the High Court: The Commission’s Statutory Test (2014) para 10.  
134 Beck v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 51; 2013 J.C. 232. 
135 He was convicted in 1982 and had previously applied – unsuccessfully – to the Commission on four 
occasions. 
136 See Beck, 2013 J.C. 232 at [25] and [26]. 
137 Beck, 2013 J.C. 232 at [26]. 
138 Beck, 2013 J.C. 232 at [55]. 
139 The confession was not used in evidence – the accused had intellectual disabilities and there were doubts 
over whether the confession had been fairly obtained. 
140 Harper, 2005 S.C.C.R. 245 at [3]. 
141 Harper, 2005 S.C.C.R. 245 at [34]. 
142 Duff, “Straddling two worlds: reflections of a retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner” (2009) 72(5) 
M.L.R. 693, 714. 
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them.143 However, as the decision not to lead this evidence at trial had been a tactical one – the 
witness was a chronic alcoholic – it did not meet the test for an appeal based on additional 
evidence.144 
 
In Beck, the appellant was convicted of robbery on a majority verdict.145 The only evidence against 
him was eyewitness identification evidence. There were two positive identifications. One was made 
by a police officer, who saw the perpetrators running down a path (although at this point they were 
wearing hoods) and jumping into a car, which then drove off. He claimed he was 18-20 feet away 
from the car and that the driver of the car had by then let his hood down.146 The other was from a 
witness who had only a fleeting view of the car, but who stated that he had got “a good look at the 
driver”.147 There were two other eyewitnesses led at trial. One was unable to identify anyone 
positively at an identification parade, but picked out the appellant as someone who “resembled the 
robbers”.148 The other was not able to make any identification at the identification parade but said 
one of the robbers had been wearing a dark coloured jacket (an item of this description was 
recovered from the appellant’s home).149 There was also some evidence that supported an alibi for 
the appellant at the time of the robbery.150  
 
Eyewitness identification is notoriously problematic and is known to be one of the leading causes of 
wrongful conviction.151 A leading study of known wrongful convictions based on DNA evidence 
contains numerous examples of cases where multiple eyewitnesses have been mistaken.152 With 
this in mind, the evidence against the appellant seems extremely thin. As the SCCRC put it in their 
referral, the jury’s verdicts:153 
 
which were by majority only, were based on the acceptance of two fleeting, stranger 
identifications made by eye witnesses who saw the getaway driver through the glass of the 
vehicle (in one case while the vehicle was in motion). ...those identifications were made 
against the background certainly of some evidence that the [appellant] resembled one of 
the perpetrators but also of various witnesses who failed to pick out the [appellant] at 
parade... 
 
The court was clearly not unaware of the dangers of eyewitness misidentification,154 but its 
response was less than convincing, with the issues being dismissed on the basis that the “practical 
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reality is that proof of guilt is daily reliant upon such testimony” and that the “system of criminal 
justice depends in large measure upon the testimony of eyewitnesses”.155 
 
That is not to say, of course, that the appellants in Harper and Beck are factually innocent. This 
simply cannot be known for sure.156 But what is clear is that the Commission had genuine doubts 
about their guilt. And in cases such as these, the lesson of Harper is that a referral on this basis is 
not going to succeed, forcing the Commission to frame cases in a way that is not conducive to the 
genuine issues in the case being given due consideration.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The SCCRC has now been in operation for 20 years and there is little doubt that it is a vast 
improvement on the system that operated before that. The 39 successful conviction referrals are 
proof of this – these are cases that prior to the existence of the Commission would have been highly 
unlikely to have even reached the appeal court. In this paper, we examined the work of the 
Commission in the light of criticisms that have been made – primarily in the context of the English 
Commission – that review bodies such as these are too cautious when deciding whether or not to 
refer a case. On the basis of our analysis, we conclude that the Commission, while maintaining a 
generally harmonious relationship with the courts, has certainly not been overly deferential to 
them.  
 
The success rate for SCCRC referrals has (after the initial period when there would have been a 
backlog of relatively strong cases) consistently been around 51 per cent – somewhat lower than the 
equivalent figure for the English Commission. While utilising the same test as the appeal court, the 
SCCRC has not been afraid to push the boundaries. This has sometimes resulted in criticism from 
the court. Such criticism is, however, rare and it is equally common for the court to make a point of 
stating that the Commission was right to refer a case, even when it did not ultimately succeed. This 
is important, as the Commission, to operate effectively, needs to retain the respect of the appeal 
court. 
 
Most of the cases that we examined were ones where the Commission and the court were not 
fundamentally at odds. There have been occasions, though, where the Commission has referred 
cases that would – on the face of it – appear to have little chance of success. Duff, as we noted 
earlier, has suggested that there may be a number of good reasons for doing this. One is that a 
referral might provide an opportunity for the law to be clarified where it is conflicting or unclear. 
Duff’s own example – Fulton – is an illustration of this, with the appeal court over-ruling a previous 
decision on corroboration. The SCCRC has not been afraid to refer further case of this nature – 
Carberry is an example – but here the court took a different view and held that seeking an 
authoritative ruling on jurors who seek out information on social media was not an acceptable 
reason for referring a case.  
 
Another of Duff’s reasons was that the referral might encourage the court to widen the criteria for 
a successful appeal. This too the Commission has done – with the referred cases of Gilmour and 
Campbell, Steele and Gray both resulting in changes to the admissibility of expert evidence. 
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However, the case in which the Commission took the most daring approach – attempting in Harper 
to argue for a miscarriage of justice on the basis of a lurking doubt – was conclusively rejected by 
the court and the Commission has not attempted to make such a referral since. This meant that 
Beck, a case which might have been referred on that basis, was instead shoehorned into a 
recognised basis for appeal and failed, a state of affairs that should give us pause for thought, given 
the paucity of the identification evidence involved.  
 
It is clear, then, that the Commission has not been overly deferential and has attempted to push the 
boundaries in cases where it felt this was merited. It has, as Griffin puts it, shown a “healthy 
independence”,157 striking an appropriate balance between referring a pool of cases that have a 
genuine chance of success (albeit sometimes a remote one) and not flooding the system with 
unmeritorious appeals. However, there appears little point in it continuing to do so once a particular 
argument has been rejected and the Commission – sensibly – recognises this. Referring a case where 
there is literally no chance of success is a waste of time and resources and unjustifiably raises the 
hopes of the applicant.158 If there is a problem with correcting wrongful convictions – and Harper 
and Beck suggest that there might be – that problem lies with the system of criminal appeals more 
broadly and not with the Commission.159 
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